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Competition, Trade and the Antitrust
Division: 1981
Joel Davido w*
One of the primary purposes-some would say the primary pur-
pose--of antitrust laws is to promote efficient allocation of resources
and maximum consumer choice by preventing and punishing artificial
barriers to competition and unreasonable restraints of trade.' The An-
titrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice has therefore con-
cerned itself with the task of breaking down those barriers. In the
domestic field, this policy has traditionally taken the form of prosecut-
ing persons and corporations who engage in price fixing or market divi-
sion, or who obtain or maintain monopoly power by means of abusive
practices. More recently, the Antitrust Division, while continuing its
attack on private restraints, has opened a second front by seeking to
narrow the scope of, or to abolish government regulations which em-
body or facilitate restrictions on competition. Sometimes this cam-
paign has taken the form of advocating deregulation-the limitation or
repeal of government regulation which suppresses competition.' At
other times, the Antitrust Division has brought suit to prevent regulat-
ed firms from engaging in restraints on competition not justified by the
* Director, Office of Policy Planning, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice; A.B., 1960,
Princeton; J.D., 1963, Columbia. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of
Joseph E. Fortenberry and Loren W. Hershey. The views expressed are those of the author and
do not represent the position of any government agency.
1 See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 90-106 (1978); W. BOWAN, PATENT AND ANTI-
TRUST LAW 1-3 (1973).
2 See Competition Advocacy and International Trade.- A New Rolefor Antitrust Policy, Re-
marks by John H. Shenefield, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the
ALI-ABA Course of Study on Int'l Antitrust Law, Washington, D.C. (May 26, 1978) [hereinafter




needs of the regulatory system.3
On the international front, as well as in the domestic field, the An-
titrust Division has long pursued a course of bringing suits to prevent
private restraints of U.S. commerce, regardless of whether the restraint
is created by Americans or foreigners.4 Here, too, the Division lately
has taken on the additional task of opposing or seeking to minimize
governmental encouragement of private restraints of trade or direct
government hindrance of trade competition. In this, as in its opposi-
tion to conspiracies in restraint of trade, the Division takes its inspira-
tion from Adam Smith, who more than two hundred years ago not only
warned against price-fixing conspiracies but also excoriated the imposi-
tion of barriers to international trade, such as quotas and tariffs, as an-
other prime source of resource misallocation.5 The Division now
speaks out strongly for freedom of commerce and against public poli-
cies which deny American consumers the benefits of international com-
petition.6 This article will survey the Division's role in dealing with
restraints on international trade imposed by firms and by governments.
THE DiviSION's ATTITUDE TOWARD PRIVATE CONDUCT
A. Horizontal Restraints on Trade
Our highest priority is to ensure that purely private restraints on
U.S. foreign commerce do not go unpunished. In four recent cases,
involving lithium,7 safes,' watches,9 and mink pelts, 10 the Division has
invoked criminal or civil law to deal with American firms or associa-
tions which pressured their foreign counterparts to prevent the sale of
competing goods in the U.S. market. The mink case, United States v.
National Board of Fur Farms,II makes two especially important points:
3 See United States v. Texas State Bd. of Public Accountancy, 464 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Tex.
1978), modKed, 592 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 925 (1979).
4 See, ag., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
5 1 A. SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 397-416 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
6 Shenefield Remarks, upra note 2. See also Possible Pitfalls In Joint Course to the Import
ReliefLaws, Or, "Is That Antitrust?", Remarks by Carl A. Cira, Jr., Ass't Chief, For. Commerce
Sec., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the World Trade Inst., New York, N.Y. (Sept.
23, 1980).
7 United States v. Foote Mineral Co., No. 74-1652 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
8 United States v. Norman Morris Corp., No. 76-495 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
9 United States v. Diebold, Inc., No. 76-9A (N.D. Ohio 1976).
10 United States v. National Bd. of Fur Farm Organizations, 395 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
11 Fur farm organizations, charged with violation of antitrust laws, filed a motion to dismiss
their indictment on the ground that they were exempt organizations under the Capper-Volstead
Act. The District Court disagreed with the defendants' premise that their exempt status was estab-
lished on the face of the indictment, but held that even assuming that the defendants were indeed
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(1) firms which fail to persuade the government to limit imports are not
permitted to take the law into their own hands and impose private limi-
tations, and (2) firms which are the beneficiaries of limited exemption
from the antitrust laws allowing them to sell or export jointly have not
been given carte blanche to engage in conduct designed to restrain their
competition with foreigners in international trade.
1 2
Conspiracies to divide up world markets, then, cannot be counte-
nanced by the Division, and may be dealt with harshly. Restriction of
world competition by means of other horizontal restraints, such as boy-




More problematical is the question of alleged monopolization or
attempted monopolization of world or U.S. markets by a foreign enter-
prise or syndicate. While it is certainly possible that a firm or cartel
could attempt to monopolize a minor market temporarily, such as by
means of predatory pricing, the vast size of the U.S. economy and the
relative infrequency of successful predatory pricing'4 make this a far
more unlikely occurrence here than the formation of a simple market
allocation or price fix. Consequently, while the Antitrust Division
stands prepared to investigate and take action against any monopolizer
or attempted monopolizer in any line of commerce, the Division will
usually be reluctant to devote a great deal of effort to pursuing foreign
firms which do no more than sell at low prices. Low prices directly
benefit the American consumer and promote price competition. 5 Con-
spiracies to restrain trade between markets tend to insulate U.S. firms
from competition. 6 Therefore, the Division will continue to place its
emphasis on halting the latter practice.
The Department, however, will challenge monopolistic conduct
which limits competition in U.S. commerce. On January 11, 1980, the
exempt organizations, the government had no duty to allege that defendants conspired with out-
siders for the purpose of defeating their exempt status. Id. at 57.
12 Id
13 See United States v. Bechtel, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,499 (D.C. Cal. 1979) (consent
decree). See also Antitrust Enforcement and the Patent System" Similarities in the European and
American Approach, Remarks by Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
before the Max Planck Inst., Munich, West Germany (Jan. 29, 1980).
14 See, e.g., Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing, 4 ANTrrRusT L. & ECON. REV. 105 (1971).
See also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
15 See Davidow, U.S. Antitrust, Free Trade, andNonmarket Economies, 12 J. WORLD TRADE




Division filed a civil suit against Hercules, Inc. charging monopoliza-
tion and attempt to monopolize the domestic sale of industrial nitrocel-
lulose. 7 Hercules, the only domestic producer of nitrocellulose, was
charged with exchanging price information with foreign producers in
order to influence and control the U.S. market price of the product.18
In a separate but related civil suit,19 the Division charged that a French
company and five other foreign producers formed a marketing pool to
coordinate their sales of industrial nitrocellulose in the United States.
The pool used an American company as its exclusive sales agent and,
thereby, fixed the price and allocated the sales of nitrocellulose im-
ported in 1977 and 1978, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Both suits seek injunctive relief.
C Exchange of Information
The Division's hostility toward privately imposed restraints of
trade should not be taken, however, as opposition to all forms of collec-
tive action taken by businesses to influence government policies. We
recognize that as a practical matter businesses must often act jointly to
provide the government with needed information and to petition the
government to take action. Such business input is important in the
trade field. We have tried by means of speeches and legal advice to the
Office of Special Trade Representative and the Departments of State
and Commerce to provide workable guidelines that will enable such
valuable activity to continue without undue fear of antitrust prosecu-
tion but accompanied by adequate safeguards against private collu-
sion.20 Exchanges of information for legitimate trade purposes which
do not have the intent or effect of limiting competition among those
exchanging it are certainly not illegal. Similar exchanges of informa-
tion in dealing with a foreign government on trade matters will most
probably not be the subject of action by the Division. Of course, the
Division will be likely to scrutinize any joint action of competitors
17 United States v. Hercules, Inc., No. 80-136 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 11, 1980).
18 Id. (Dec. 16, 1980) (consent decree), reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 85840 (1980).
19 United States v. Societe Nationale des Poudres et Explosifs and Fayette Chemical Corp.,
No. 80-149 (D.NJ. filed Jan. 1980). A settlement was proposed on Dec. 19, 1980, but is not final
(copy of proposed final judgment on file in offices of the Northwestern Journal of International
Law & Business). See also 46 Fed. Reg. 3671 (1981).
20 See, eg., Exchange of Informationfor Presentation to Government Agencies: The Interplay of
the Container andNoerr Doctrines, Remarks by Donald 1. Baker, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Anti-
trust Div., before the ABA Nat'l Inst., Section of Antitrust Law, Hollywood, Fla. (Feb. 27, 1975);
Letter from Donald I. Baker, Ass't Atfy Gen., Antitrust Div., to Robert S. Strauss, Special Repre-
sentative for Trade Negotiations (April 19, 1977) (copy on file in offices of the Northwestern Jour-
nal of International Law & Business).
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which goes beyond petitioning a government and amounts to voluntary
exchange of pricing, marketing and other data (particularly confiden-
tial data and data clearly identifying individual firms and transactions)
and could be used to effect price-fixing or market division.
Also, we would seek to prevent or punish joint action aimed to
harass competitors, domestic or foreign, through the bringing of
groundless actions under the antitrust, antidumping, countervailing
duty, or escape clause statutes or a combination of them.22 The Anti-
trust Division would be concerned, for example, if a trade association
were used as the vehicle through which domestic competitors
threatened the filing of baseless antidumping complaints in order to
induce foreign producers to promise to make upward adjustments in
their prices. 23 Also, antitrust issues may be raised in the event of a
price-restrictive "settlement" of an antidumping or countervailing duty
case carried out by the affected private parties without the participation
and approval of relevant government officials.
THE DIVISION'S ROLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Turning from the issue of privately imposed restraints to the issue
of those created by governmental action, the Antitrust Division takes
an active interest in those administrative proceedings which involve in-
ternational competition issues or which may result in limitations on in-
ternational competition. These are primarily Section 337
proceedings,24 antidumping proceedings, 25 actions under the "escape
clause" of the tariff laws,26 proceedings to impose countervailing du-
ties,27 and market disruption cases involving imports from communist
countries.2 8
In its activity with respect to those proceedings the Antitrust Divi-
sion seeks to further two distinct policies. First, the Division is inter-
ested in seeing that a sound interpretation is given to those statutes-
Section 337, the antidumping and countervailing duty laws-which
21 See generally United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States
v. Amax, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,467 (N.D. I1. 1977).
22 See generall California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
23 See, e.g., .4ntitrust Risks in.4busing the Import Relief Laws, Remarks by Douglas E. Rosen-
thal, former Chief, For. Commerce Sec., Antitrust Div., before Practicing Law Inst., Washington,
D.C. (Nov. 9, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Rosenthal Remarks].
24 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
25 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. III 1979).
26 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (Supp. I1 1979).
27 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (Supp. III 1979).
28 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
The Antitrust Division
2:300(1980)
embody similar concepts to those contained in the U.S. antitrust laws.
This is part of the Division's amicus work in seeking to achieve good
sense and coherence in American rules dealing with business competi-
tion. Second, the Division seeks to insure with respect to all those pro-
ceedings that decisions on the merits and on relief are reached with full
awareness of the importance of not hindering foreign competition arbi-
trarily or restricting it more broadly than necessary to achieve legiti-
mate trade purposes. The Division has advocated these policies in
several recent administrative proceedings including the pending carbon
steel antidumping case, 29 the, recent Pakistan cotton imports counter-
vailing duties case,30 the recently-concluded subway car antidumping
case,31 and others which are discussed below.
A. Section 337 Actions
Section 337 proceedings are brought under a broadly worded stat-
ute forbidding unfair practices in international trade.32 In practice,
these actions have focused until recently primarily on the protection of
American patent rights. 3 While some decisions of the United States
International Trade Commission (ITC) indicated that the Commission
might take the view that Section 337 be enforced as a general antitrust
statute,34 there has, in fact, been no clear trend of cases to indicate that
such a development has occurred.35
The Division has taken an active role in participating in Section
337 cases, particularly when we have believed the case to be inappro-
priate or duplicative. Since 1975, the ITC has been required by law to
consult the Justice Department and FTC on competition issues in these
29 Certain Carbon Steel Products, Investigation Nos. 731-TA-18/24 (I.T.C., filed March 21,
1980), I.T.C. Pub. No. 1064 (May, 1980), 1 ITRD (BNA) 5527.
30 Textiles and Textile Products of Cotton from Pakistan, Investigation No. 731-TA-62
(I.T.C., filed April 8, 1980), I.T.C. Pub. No. 1086 (July 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 49398 (1980).
31 Rail Passenger Cars and Parts Thereof from Italy and Japan, Investigation Nos. 731-TA-
5/6, (I.T.C., filed Jan. 1, 1980), I.T.C. Pub. No. 1034 (Feb. 1980), 1 ITRD (BNA) 5229.
32 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) provides that:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United
States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or
tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economi-
cally operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to
restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States are declared unlawful ....
33 Rosenthal & Sheldon, Section 337 A Vfewfrom Two Wthin the Department of Justice, 8
GA. J. INT. & Comp. L. 47, 48-49 (1978).
34 See, eg., Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, 43 Fed. Reg. 8304 (I.T.C. 1978),
disafpproved by President, 43 Fed. Reg. 17789 (1978), 1 ITRD (BNA) 5245; Certain Electronic
Audio and Related Equipment, Investigation No. 337-TA-7 (I.T.C., filed Feb. 10, 1976), I.T.C.
Pub. No. 768 (April 1976).
35 Id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 2:300(1980)
cases. 36 In fact, the remedial portions of Section 337 grant the ITC
explicit authority to refuse a remedy "after considering. . . competi-
tive conditions in the United States economy."37 These provisions ob-
viously provide a basis for Antitrust Division advice. In Welded
Stainless Ppe and Tube, the Division urged that the ITC decline juris-
diction on the ground that the complainant had alleged a dumping
rather than an antitrust violation, and that the matter ought to be re-
ferred to the Treasury Department. 38 The ITC disagreed, but President
Carter refused to exclude the goods for reasons similar to those ad-
vanced by the Antitrust Division.39 In Color TV, the Division also ar-
gued, inter alia, that the claim was a redundant antidumping charge
masquerading as a Section 337 claim.' The Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and the Treas-
ury and State Departments supported this contention, but the ITC
rejected these arguments.41
The effect of provision 1105(a)(2) of the Trade Agreements Act of
197942 is to alleviate the problem of duplicative remedies which con-
cerned the Antitrust Division. This subsection amends Section 337 to
require the ITC not to entertain countervailing duty or antidumping
complaints posing as Section 337 claims, while permitting the Commis-
sion to continue to hear hybrid cases in which both Section 337 and
countervailing duty or antidumping claims are made-provided the
latter claims are tracked through Commerce.4 3 Nevertheless, the Divi-
sion remains concerned that duplicative remedies are a potential im-
pediment to freedom of commerce, and may continue to advocate this
view as appropriate.
The Antitrust Division now routinely reviews Section 337 com-
plaints filed at the ITC, together with interim and final recommenda-
tions by the ITC, to determine whether to comment on a case or a
recommendation. For instance, the Division filed comments with the
ITC recommending that the exclusion order for doxycycline not apply
36 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2) (1976).
37 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
38 43 Fed. Reg. 8304 (I.T.C. 1978), disapproved by President, 43 Fed. Reg. 17789 (1978), 1
ITRD (BNA) 5245.
39 Id
40 Letter from Jonathan C. Rose, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., to ITC Chairman Will E. Leonard
(Sept. 23, 1976) (copy on file in offices of the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Busi-
ness).
41 Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, Investigation No. 337-TA-23 (I.T.C., filed March
5, 1977), I.T.C. Pub. No. 938 (May 1977).




to amounts that had already been imported.44 A majority of the ITC
agreed with this recommendation. 45 The Division also has the oppor-
tunity to participate in inter-agency reviews of affirmative ITC pro-
ceedings and thereby influence recommendations made to the
President based on the record developed at the ITC.
The Antitrust Division is also interested in the settlement of Sec-
tion 337 matters. While aware of the benefits of settlement and reluc-
tant to discourage settlement, we also desire to ensure that settlements
are in the public interest and reflect the judgment of the agency or
agencies involved and the policy of the particular statute in question,
rather than being merely a reflection of the private interests of the par-
ties or even amounting to a price-fixing or market allocation agree-
ment. Settlements should not be so restrictive as to reduce future price
competition among firms and thus lead to results little different from
the results of price-fixing.'
In this respect, in a recent Section 337 proceeding, the petitioner
challenged the import of precision resistors from France allegedly man-
ufactured with stolen know-how.47 The respondent interposed what
amounted to a counterclaim alleging an attempt to monopolize under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The settlement entered into by the par-
ties and considered by the Commission was similarly reviewed by the
Division pursuant to its Section 337 authority.4 8
An interesting variation on the Division's statutory role under Sec-
tion 337 has arisen as a result of the ITC embarking on its first substan-
tive rule-making. On February 27, 1980, the Commission proposed
requiring country-of-origin marking on imported steel wire rope.4 9
The Division has submitted comments ° opposing the rule-making for
44 Comments of U.S. Dep't of Justice, In the Matter of Doxycycline, Investigation No. 337-
TA-3 (I.T.C., filed March 27, 1979), I.T.C. Pub. No. 964 (April 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 22523 (I.T.C.
1979).
45 In the Matter of Doxycycline, Investigation No. 337-TA-3 (I.T.C., filed March 27, 1979),
I.T.C. Pub. No. 964 (April 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 22523 (I.T.C. 1979).
46 See Rosenthal Remarks, supra note 23; TheAntitrust Division's Activities in theArea ofInter-
national Trade, Remarks by Alexander W. Sierck, Dir. of Trade Pory, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, before World Trade Inst., New York, N.Y. (Sept. 6, 1979).
47 Certain Precision Resistor Chips, Investigation Nos. 337-TA-63/65 (I.T.C., filed May 9,
1980).
48 Joint Motion to Terminate with Prejudice, In the Matter of Certain Precision Resistor
Chips, Investigation Nos. 337-TA-63/65 (I.T.C. filed May 9, 1980).
49 Proposed Rule Requiring Country-Of-Origin Marking On Imported Steel Wire Rope, 45
Fed. Reg. 12835 (1980) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. ch.IJ, subch. C).
50 Comments of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, In the Matter of Proposed Rule Requiring Country-
Of-Origin Marking On Imported Steel Wire Rope, 45 Fed. Reg. 12835 (1980) (copy on file at
offices of Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
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two reasons. First, substantive unfair trade practice rule-making ex-
ceeds the legislative mandate of the ITC and hinders the President's
responsibilities to take action on recommendations by the ITC under
Section 337.51 Second, the proposed rule attempts to regulate persons
not engaged in import and conflicts with extant statutes and regula-
tions.52
. Antidumping Proceedings
While Section 337 is basically an international unfair trade prac-
tices statute, the antidumping law also has the aspects of an antitrust
law (to prevent price discrimination used for monopolization of Ameri-
can markets) and of a "fair competition" statute (to prevent low-priced
sales which take business from American sellers). The Antitrust Divi-
sion takes an active interest in the antidumping law. The Division rec-
ognizes that a law against price discrimination, interpreted too strictly,
can deter vigorous price competition. Therefore, Division statements
submitted to the ITC may deal with the issue of defining the relevant
"industry, .... like product," or causality in a particular case, by offering
an independent evaluation of the history, structure and conduct of a
particular industry.
For instance, in the recent preliminary injury determination by the
ITC on the U.S. Steel petition for antidumping relief, the Division sub-
mitted an extensive statement addressing several issues.5 3 The Division
suggested: (1) the use of a different base period upon which to make
the injury determination; (2) an examination of only the most current
conditions of the industry; (3) the disaggregation of carbon steel prod-
ucts into separate product categories by each country of import; and (4)
an evaluation of current and past industry performance indicating no
material injury or threat thereof by examining revenues, prices, profits,
shipments and capacity utilization. 4 Although the ITC voted in favor
of a preliminary finding of injury,55 two of the Commissioners wrote
opinions analyzing injury by disaggregating the separate product lines
51 Id. at 5-10.
52 Id. at 10-17.
53 Statement of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, In the Matter of Certain Carbon Steel Products,
Investigation Nos. 731-TA-18/24 (I.T.C., filed March 21, 1980), I.T.C. Pub. No. 1064 (May 1980),
I ITRD (BNA) 5526 (copy on fie at offices of Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business).
54 Id at 3-38.
55 In the Matter of Certain Carbon Steel Products, Investigation Nos. 731-TA-18/24 (I.T.C.,
filed March 21, 1980), I.T.C. Pub. No. 1064 (May 1980), 1 ITRD (BNA) 5526.
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by country of import thus following the Division recommendation.56
The revised antidumping law57 contains some procedural im-
provements over the prior law. It allows speedier disposition of anti-
dumping matters and provides some clarification of the law. It remains
to be seen whether the shorter procedures serve to prevent the length of
antidumping cases from being a clog on competition, and do not un-
duly sacrifice opportunities for parties to present their cases adequately.
The Division addressed its concerns about possible undue re-
straints on import competition by commenting on proposed revisions of
the antidumping duty regulations .5  Three areas of concern were
noted: (1) the possibility of action taken on the basis of incomplete
information; (2) the possible abuse of the regulatory process by the
filing of spurious petitions; and (3) the concern that relief granted
might be in excess of that needed to offset the injury.
The Division has long urged the ITC to hold that alleged injury by
reason of less-than-fair-value (LTFV) sales should not automatically
be found where those sales merely match equally low prices of a
domestic firm, a position supported by the 1974 report of the Senate
Finance Committee,59 and one consistent with the Trade Agreements
Act of 197960 as well. Nevertheless, in making its injury determination,
the ITC may take into account the price suppression effect of LTFV
sales.6' We have also argued that the ITC in making its determination
of injury, should always take account of the competitive context in
which the sales of the imported merchandise occurred.62 Thus, a
higher level of market penetration should be required to be shown in
cases involving concentrated U.S. industries than in industries with
56 1 ITRD (BNA) at 5530, 5541 (Alberger, C., and Stern, C.).
57 19 U.S.C. § 1673(a)-(i) (Supp. III 1979).
58 Comments of the U.S. Dep't of Justice on Proposed Revision of the Custom Regulations
Relating to Antidumping Duties (copy on file at offices of Northwestern Journal of International
Law & Business).
59 See Brief of the Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice at 13, Northern Bleached Hardwood
Kraft Pulp from Canada, 38 Fed. Reg. 87 (TariffComm'n 1973); S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 130 (1974), reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7316.
60 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(c)(ii) (Supp. III 1979) which mandates that the ITC evaluate the
effects of price undercutting, price depression and price suppression in making its injury determi-
nation.
61 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(ii) (Supp. III 1979).
62 Comments of the U.S. Dep't of Justice on Proposed Procedures For the Conduct of Investi-
gations of Whether Injury to Domestic Industries Results From Imports Sold at Less Than Fair
Value or From Subsidized Imports to the United States (Dec. 4, 1979); Statement of U.S. Dep't of
Justice In The Matter of Certain Glass-Lined Steel Storage Tanks and Glass-Lined Steel Pressure
Vessels, and Parts Thereof, From France, Investigation No. 701-TA-64 (I.T.C., filed Sept. 9, 1980)
(copies on file at offices of Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
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many competitors, and that antidumping policy should not be used to
create a "price umbrella" under which inefficient domestic industries
could survive and even prosper.63
In the recent antidumping case involving subway cars from Japan
and Italy, the Division contended that the petitioner, the Budd Com-
pany, failed to prove injury in view of a Buy-American preference in
the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1978. 64 The Division ar-
gued that such a provision granted relief to the American transit car
industry and that, in any event, in order to comply with the federal law,
the Japanese and Italian firms would be required to assemble cars in
the U.S. with parts of U.S. origin of more than 50% in value.65 The
ITC, agreeing with the Division's position, decided that the domestic
industry had not been injured.66
Justice, in another recent case, Canadian Nails,67 contended that
the domestic industry had not been injured by reason of imports of
Canadian nails, since Canadian nails only comprised a small part of
domestic nail imports and since those nails often sold above U.S. nail
prices. The ITC agreed in concluding that the domestic industry had
not been injured.68 During the Mexican Tomatoes LTFV proceeding
before the Treasury Department, the Division questioned whether
Congress intended the same policy to apply in determining LTFV with
respect to seasonal agricultural products as is applied with respect to
mined and manufactured products.69 In November, 1979, the Treasury
Department-at that time the responsible authority-found no sales of
less than fair value.7°
63 Brief of the Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice at 7, 11-23, Large Power Transformers
from France, Italy, Japan, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, 37 Fed. Reg. 8136 (Tariff
Comm'n 1972).
64 Statement of the Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, at 8-10, In the Matter of Rail Passen-
ger Cars and Parts Thereof from Italy and Japan, Investigation Nos. 731-TA-5/6 (Preliminary)
(I.T.C., filed Jan. 1, 1980), I.T.C. Pub. No. 1034 (Feb. 1980), 1 ITRD (BNA) 5229.
65 Id at 14.
66 Rail Passenger Cars and Parts Thereof from Italy and Japan, Determination of No Injury
or Likelihood Thereof in Investigations Nos. 73 1-TA-5/6 (I.T.C., filed Jan. 1, 1980), I.T.C. Pub.
No. 1034 (Feb. 1980), 1 ITRD (BNA) 5229.
67 Comments of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, In The Matter of Certain Steel Wire Nails From
Canada, Investigation No. AA1921-89 (I.T.C., fied Nov. 15, 1978), I.T.C. Pub. No. 937 (Feb.
1979).
68 Certain Steel Wire Nails From Canada, Determination of No Injury in Investigation No.
AA1921-89 (I.T.C., filed Nov. 15, 1978), I.T.C. Pub. No. 937 (Feb. 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 7840
(I.T.C. 1979).
69 Letter From John H. Shenefield, Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Robert H.
Mundherin, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (July 16, 1979) (copy on file at offices of
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
70 Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables from Mexico, I ITRD (BNA) 5339 (1980).
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C. Escape Clause and Proceedings
Escape clause proceedings 71 have more affinity with traditional
tariff and quota barriers to trade than do Section 337 and antidumping
procedures. The latter focus on unfair and possibly anticompetitive
practices while the former can be invoked in the event of serious injury
or threat of serious injury to American industry, even when that injury
comes about as the result of greater productive efficiency on the part of
foreign industry.
While the Trade Act of 1974 requires the ITC, in advising the
President on import relief measures, to take into account the economic
factors listed in Section 202(c) of that Act, including the effect on con-
sumers and competition,7 2 there are other economic factors listed in
that subsection, such as effect on employment, which may come into
conflict with the interests of consumers and the general interest in pre-
serving competition. Consequently, the Antitrust Division sometimes
deems it necessary or advisable to intervene in escape clause proceed-
ings to ensure that these interests are given proper weight when the
record is being developed at the ITC.
In the recent Stainless Steel andAlloy Tool Steel escape clause ex-
tension proceeding,73 for instance, the Division urged the ITC to take
into consideration the fact that imports of specialty steel products may
provide necessary incentives to innovation and price competition in
that concentrated industry.74 Similarly, the Division questioned
whether the proper standard for measuring the effectiveness of import
relief is "recovery" of the domestic industry, as that industry argued, or
whether it is simply time for adjustment to an increased level of im-
ports.75
In the Clothespin case,76 the Division argued at the Trade Policy
Staff Committee level that import relief, if granted, should take the less
71 The term "escape clause" refers to provisions in the legislation that allow relief from tariff
concessions which are causing injury to domestic industry. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (Supp. III
1979).
72 Trade Act of 1974, § 202(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(i)(4) (1976).
73 Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, Investigation No. 203-TA-5 (I.T.C., filed Nov. 30,
1978), I.T.C. Pub. No. 968 (April 1980).
74 Prehearing Brief of the Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice at 29, Stainless Steel and Alloy
Tool Steel, Investigation No. 203-TA-5 (I.T.C., filed Nov. 30, 1978), I.T.C. Pub. No. 968 (April
1980).
75 Id at 16.
76 Clothespins From The People's Republic of China, The Polish People's Republic, and The
Socialist Republic of Romania, Investigation Nos. TA-406-2/3/4 (I.T.C., filed May 16, 1978),
I.T.C. Pub. No. 902 (Aug. 1978), 1 ITRD (BNA) 5435.
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restrictive form of tariffs rather than quotas.77 The President, however,
granted quota relief for this industry, essentially comprised of three
small firms in an economically depressed area of rural Maine.78  The
Division was more successful in the Zinc case 79 in its argument to the
ITC that increased imports had not been shown to have caused the
industry's problems. The ITC majority so found and import relief was
denied." The Division enjoyed a similar success at the Trade Policy
Staff Committee and Trade Policy Review Group levels in advocating,
along with other agencies, that these groups recommend to the Presi-
dent that no relief was appropriate in the case of imported copper.8 '
The President followed that recommendation. 2
Similarly, Justice took part in deliberations of the Trade Policy
Committee in formulating options for the President on color television
import relief8 3 The domestic color television industry had enjoyed
three years of relief from imports through the use of orderly marketing
agreements (OMA's) with Japan, Korea and Taiwan and sought an ex-
tension of the OMA's on the same terms." Justice, in concurrence with
several other major participants in the interagency meetings, took the
position that industry conditions had sufficiently improved to warrant
the complete termination of import relief.8 5 The President, in turn,
chose to terminate relief as to imports from Japan and continue the
relief as to color televisions from Taiwan and Korea on a modest
scale. 6
77 These discussions were in private interagency sessions, and therefore no documents are
publicly available.
78 Temporary Quantitative Limitation on the Importation into the United States of Certain
Clothespins, 44 Fed. Reg. 10973 (1979).
79 Statement of the U.S. Dep't of Justice on Unalloyed, Unwrought Zinc, Investigation No.
TA-201-31 (I.T.C., filed Dec. 29, 1978), I.T.C. Pub. No. 894 (June 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 27908
(I.T.C. 1978).
80 Unalloyed, Unwrought Zinc, Investigation No. TA-201-31 (I.T.C., filed Dec. 29, 1977),
I.T.C. Pub. No. 894 (June 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 27908 (I.T.C. 1978).
81 See note 77 supra.
82 See Unalloyed, Unwrought Copper, Investigation No. TA-201-32 (I.T.C., filed Feb. 23,
1978), I.T.C. Pub. No. 905 (Aug. 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 49523 (1978).
83 See note 77 supra.
84 The OMA with Japan was announced in Presidential Proclamation 4511, 42 Fed. Reg.
32747 (1977); the OMA's with Korea and Taiwan in Presidential Proclamation 4634,44 Fed. Reg.
5633 (1979).
85 See note 77 supra.
86 Extension of the Orderly Marketing Agreements and Temporary Quantitative Limitations
on the Importation Into the United States of Color Television Receivers and Certain Subassem-
blies Thereof, 45 Fed. Reg. 45237 (1980).
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D. Countervailing Duty Cases
The latest type of administrative proceeding in which the Antitrust
Division may come to play an important part are those involving coun-
tervailing duties.87 These cases involve the issue of subsidization by
government rather than conspiracy or abuse by private firms. In the
past, except in the case of duty-free goods, duties were imposed without
regard to injury to any industry in the U.S. Hence the Antitrust Divi-
sion had little to say in these proceedings and did not seek to partici-
pate in them. Now, as a result of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,88
the standard for imposition of countervailing duties is material injury
to an existing or potential American industry. 9 Plainly the Division
may contribute on this issue, as it does in injury inquiries under the
escape clause and antidumping laws. The Justice Department, as it has
done in other trade proceedings in the past, will tend to intervene in
those cases where a major domestic industry is involved, especially if
that industry is one which is highly concentrated or less than fully com-
petitive or if that industry is one with respect to which the Division has
special knowledge or interest because of past or present antitrust viola-
tions. In these situations, Justice will usually be disposed to intervene if
the import relief proposed in the form of countervailing duties will
have substantial negative effects on competition or if important issues
of trade law and policy are involved.
In a recent ITC final countervailing duty injury determination,
Coton Textiles from Pakistan,9" the Division submitted a statement
treating two substantial issues. First, the Division advocated a defini-
tion of the relevant industry that would take into account both produc-
tion and consumption aspects of the product involved.9' Second, the
Division submitted data on the average margin of underselling on each
of six separate products and pointed out that the average subsidy paid
by the government of Pakistan would account for less than 25% of the
87 Countervailing duties are imposed when the administrative authority determines that the
manufacture, production, or exportation of merchandise imported into the United States is being
subsidized, directly or indirectly, and the ITC determines that an industry in the United States is
materially injured, threatened with material injury, or its establishment is materially retarded by
reason of imports of such merchandise. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (Supp. III 1979).
88 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified in scattered
sections of 13, 19, 26, 28 U.S.C.).
89 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (Supp. 111 1979).
90 Textiles and Textile Products of Cotton From Pakistan, Investigation Nos. 701-TA-62/63
(June 19, 1980).
91 Prehearing Statement of the U.S. Dep't of Justice at 8, In the Matter of Textiles and Textile
Products of Cotton from Pakistan, Investigation Nos. 701-TA-62/63 (June 19, 1980).
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margin of underselling.92 The Commission ruled 5-0 that no injury
had occurred as a result of the subsidized imports.93
THE DIVISION'S ROLE IN TRADE POLICY
The Justice Department, through the Antitrust Division, partici-
pates in the day-to-day work of the Trade Policy Committee's
subordinate committees, the Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG), at
the assistant cabinet secretary level, and the Trade Policy Staff Com-
mittee (TPSC), that meet frequently on trade policy matters. These
matters include a wide variety of topics, from vegetables to steel, from
petrochemicals to computers.
For the last year these interagency groups have devoted most of
their time to recommending policy objectives and priorities for the To-
kyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) and for U.S.
implementing legislation, the Trade' Agreements Act of 1979, which
President Carter signed on July 19, 1979.94 Indeed, during the first half
of 1979, the TPSC and its subcommittees met frequently to work on
MTN matters at which the Department participated and was able to
present competition policy concerns in a wide variety of contexts.95
The Department's primary objective in participating in these inter-
agency trade policy groups is to ensure that competition policy values
receive a high priority among the considerations that lead to a particu-
lar U.S. policy position. In this setting the Department argues for a
U.S. economy that is freely open to the stimulus and benefits of foreign
competition.
In the months ahead, the interagency consultative groups in which
the Department is active will be concerned with the implementation of
the MTN accords by the various signatory nations, as well as by agen-
cies of the U.S. Government. The new provisions on antidumping,
countervailing duties, standards, and government procurement all pres-
ent potentially complex and important implementation issues.
Justice expects to continue to participate in developing policy ap-
proaches for the current MTN negotiations on the Safeguards Code,
which seeks to establish conditions for the grant of temporary relief
from import competition. In our judgment, the obligations of a code
covering the grant of temporary import relief should be applied to all
92 Id at 11-21.
93 See note 30 supra.
94 See note 42 supra.
95 See note 77 supra.
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forms of bilateral and multilateral arrangements affecting the price or
volume of imports in which our trading partners participate.
The Department also comments on other legislative proposals in
the trade area. One area involves proposals -to expand the Webb-
Pomerene Act,96 which exempts export associations from the applica-
tion of the antitrust laws. Such Webb Act associations number only
about 30 and participate in less than 1.5% of our export trade.97 Bills
presently pending in the Senate and House provide, inter alia, that the
exemption be extended to cover services as well as goods and to cover
export trading companies.98 The proposed legislation provides for a
new certification process which requires a showing of particularized
need and a disclosure of the scope and method of operation of the ex-
port association or trading company.99 The Administration, following
an inter-agency consultation including the Division, has endorsed the
approach of Senate bill S.2718."°
The Department is also involved with the work of the Commodi-
ties Policy Task Force, an inter-agency group which advises on objec-
tives to be sought in the negotiations for proposed international
commodities agreements. Under the recent government reorganization
plan,10 1 the Special Trade Representative has assumed responsibility
for commodity policy. The Antitrust Division will continue to play an
active consultative role.
The Division advised the Task Force that private participation in
the implementation of commodity stabilization agreements would
render them vulnerable to attack under the antitrust laws, and that pri-
vate agreements or side-deals arising out of these agreements are even
less likely to escape antitrust scrutiny than private involvement in car-
rying out public agreements.'0 2 The Division also urged that commod-
ity stabilization agreements, however desirable they may be from the
standpoint of U.S. political or economic goals, must be implemented in
a reasonable and non-discriminatory manner and that the U.S. should
always bear in mind that the best long-run solution to trade imbalances
96 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976).
97 Comment, The Webb-PomereneAct: A Reexamination of Export Cartels in World Trade, 19
VA. J. INT'L L. 151, 173 (1978).
98 See S. 864, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 2718, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S. 2748, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
99 S. 2718, § 4(b)(1), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
100 See Hearings on S. 2718 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance of the Sen. Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980) (statement of Philip M. Klutznick,
See'y of Com.).
101 Exec. Order No. 12188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (Jan. 4, 1980).
102 See note 77 supra.
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is a system of free trade, whatever departures from free trade may be
necessary over the short term.
103
The Antitrust Division's participation in these various groups and
committees is of relatively recent origin, and, as a result our contribu-
tion has initially not been as great as that of some agencies with greater
experience. But our knowledge of the relation between competition
policy and trade policy is growing rapidly and thus our contribution in
these areas should increase accordingly. 104
Much remains to be done in removing and preventing barriers to
international trade. In continuing its varied prosecutorial and consult-
ative tasks, the Antitrust Division believes it can make a substantial
contribution toward those important goals.
103 Id.
104 Shenefield Remarks, note 2 supra.
